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Abstract
We propose an epistemic logic in which knowledge is fully introspective and implies truth although truth need
not imply epistemic possibility The logic is presented in sequential format and is interpreted in a natural
class of partial models called balloon models We examine the notions of honesty and circumscription in this
logic What is the state of an agent that only knows   and which honest   enable such circumscription
Redening stable sets enables us to provide suitable syntactic and semantic criteria for honesty The rough
syntactic denition of honesty is the existence of a minimal stable expansion so the problem resides in the
ordering relation underlying minimality We discuss three di	erent proposals for this ordering together with
their semantic counterparts and show their e	ects on the induced notions of honesty
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  Introduction
In this paper we argue that honesty in knowledge representation calls for a partial approach
for reasons of adequacy and eciency Let us informally explain the matter starting by
indicating that there are good reasons to embed epistemic logic in a partial modal context
 

The rst reason deals with lack of truth if an agent considers no world possible in which
p is true it may simply mean that he does not reckon with p rather than that he knows
that  p is true In other words the absence of truth of a formula in the agents alternatives
should not imply the presence of the negated formula in his knowledgestate Secondly it
o	ers a more natural way to deal with growth of information in a classical possible world
semantics this grow of information can only be modelled by elimination of possible worlds
Hence certainty grows parallel with new information In the partial approach the agent may
constructively add worlds to his alternatives or ll them up with new gained evidence In this
 
 BP shows how partial possible world semantics may present a ne analysis of propositional atti
tudes	  Jas
 provides an extensive motivation for using partial modal logic when studying logics of knowledge
 Introduction  
way disjunctive information 
generally giving rise to the construction of several worlds is
generating uncertainty Thirdly the notion of active disbelief that partial epistemic logic can
distinguish makes the principle of negative introspection more natural than in the classical
case if we now have    it means that the agent has constructed himself a possibility in
which   is true and hence it seems natural to expect that he than also knows this    
Let us now give some technical arguments for laying the foundations for epistemic logic in a
partial semantics it allows for a greater exibility with respect to the epistemic background
logic For the case study presented in this paper this is revealed in adopting the veridicality
principle of knowledge     without being forced to accept its contrapositive  
 
if something is true you must consider it possible Moreover knowledge will be
fully introspective both positive introspection and negative introspection as well as their
contrapositives are properties our logic embraces In all the logic resembles a weak variant
of the classical system S although its epistemic properties are stronger than socalled weak
S Apart from tting our intuitions about 
strong knowledge this logic enables us to
simplify the partial models needed essentially omitting most of the relational structure
Having motivated our choice for partial semantics for epistemic logic we now argue that
the treatment of honesty makes the need for partiality even more eminent The notion of
honesty was introduced by Halpern and Moses 
HM who presented a thorough study of
honesty for the classical case Honesty is the quality of a proposition which can be said to
be only known ie knowing that fact and its consequences but not knowing more than that
For example you may only know p without knowing anything at all about say q Also
you may only know that either p or q will be the case which implies you do not know which
one of the two is true These are examples of honest knowledge By contrast you cannot
sincerely claim to only know 
that you know whether p is true for then you would either
know p or know that  p both options being logically stronger than what is supposed to be
known Hence the formula 
 p   p is called dishonest
Partiality and honesty may seem totally unrelated themes but in fact we argue that they
are closely related Let us reinspect the case in which you only know p This we claim
does not involve any knowledge about q In particular it does not even imply that you
know the possibility that q In a straightforward total semantics ignorance leads to wide
knowledge of possibilities which however contradicts the initial idea of only knowing some
honest formula The proliferation problem simply does not occur in our partial semantics
since facts unrelated to some honest formula can be left undened In other words when
considering the consequences of saying that one only knows  classical approaches try to
maximize possibilities whereas a partial treatment economizes them Thus not only is the
relational structure of our partial models simple using them we also gain eciency which
is reected in the small size of the characterizing models whereas a classical possible world
model tends to explode when representing ignorance
Apart from the fact that our partial semantics both allows for a greater exibility of
the underlying epistemic background logic and elegantly solves the proliferation problem
by economizing possibilities let us try and indicate how we think our approach to honesty
improves upon classical treatments A rst di	erence deals with the logical omniscience of
a  possibly totally ignorant  agent and is related to the proliferation problem In the
classical approach of HM for instance the formula  is perfectly honest doing justice to
 The Logic 
the fact that it makes sense to claim that one knows nothing We agree with the designation
of  being honest but we depart from HM when determining the consequences of such
an observation Let us write for any honest formula  and epistemic formula 
j 
for the agent knows  if he claims to only know  Then in the framework of HM one
obtains j  when  is an Stautology and one also obtains j s s for any atom
s However we prefer the ignorant agent who only knows  to really let him know no more
than that in our setup we have j  i	  is a tautology Now there are relatively few
tautologies in partial logic all of them essentially contain  More generally we agree with
the analysis of HM that objective 
propositional formulas should be rendered honest but
we depart from HM when it comes to the j consequences of such formulas Generalizing
the situation we gave above one may say that our j gives a serious account of relevance 
if  and  have no proposition symbol in common and do not contain  then  j  Thus
eg p j 
q   q
Moving up in the hierarchy from objective formulas to epistemic statements our classica
tion of honest formulas is starting to diverge from the classical analysis We agree with that
analysis that disjunctive epistemic assertions often are problematic with regard to honesty
The argument runs like this the formula    p   q is dishonest only knowing  implies
not knowing any stronger formula in particular this gives not knowing p and not knowing q
but the latter two conclusions are easily seen to be inconsistent with  However where the
framework of HM does indeed label the disjunctive epistemic formula 
 p q dishonest
we think their setup still yields some counterintuitive results For instance their denitions
are such that the disjunctive epistemic formula   
p q is still honest But here we
think a similar argument as for 
 p q can be given to account for s dishonesty if you
only know that you either consider p to be possible or q 
to be possible then you must
know which of the two
In the next section we introduce the epistemic logic presenting its language semantics and
inference system and prove its completeness Then in section  we study ways to minimize
knowledge for this logic discussing di	erent notions of honesty For each of these notions
we present deductive modeltheoretic and syntactic characterizations
 The Logic
In this section we introduce a partial modal logic L of which we will investigate the notions
of stability honesty and several disjunction properties in subsequent sections We present
our logic following a common pattern we rst give its language and semantics 
section 
then we provide a deductive system for L 
 and nally prove a completeness result 

connecting syntax 
deduction and semantics 
consequence
 Language and Semantics
Definition   Let P be a nonempty countable set of propositional variables The lan
guage L is the smallest superset of P such that
   L    
  	   L
 The Logic 
L

is the subset of L of all formulas which do not contain  operators For any  
 L
we write 

for   L

and  for f  L j   g Moreover for any  
 L and any
  f  g we dene   f j   g and 
 
  f j   g
Here the intended meaning of   is that  is known We write  for  	    for
 
     and  for     It is important to note that in our setup  does not just
mean that   is not known but that the agent considers some epistemic alternative to be
possible in which  has a meaning it is true
Given a set of formulas  we may consider its objective kernel 


 the knowledge it
encodes 
 
 
 and its possibilities 

 
 These sets induce the following orderings
Definition  Let  and  be sets of formulas of L Then
  


 


 

  

 
  
 
 
  
 

  


 
 
 
 
 

Each of these orders can be linked to an equivalence relation eg  

  

 

 Let
 be some subset of 
L the power set of L For any   f g we say that   
is 

 
minimal in  if for all     

 
 and similarly for 
minimality in  Note
that these minimal sets are the rst 
smallest elements with respect to the corresponding
ordering rather than the elements without a predecessor
We now give a formal interpretation of the language L The mathematical structure for
such an interpretation is a Kripke model with partial worlds Since we are only interested
in models for our epistemic logic here we do not have to consider arbitrary partial Kripke
models

Instead we restrict attention to what we call balloon models which are somewhat
reminiscent of the wellknownKDKripke models The basic entities in our balloon models
are partial worlds which are linked to partial valuations
Definition  A partial valuation V is a partial function which assigns truthvalues to
a given set of propositional variables P  The collection of all partial valuations is denoted
by VAL The domain of V is dened as Dom
V   f p  P j V 
p  f g g V

 VAL is
said to be an extension of V  VAL if V 
p  V


p for all p  Dom
V  We abbreviate the
extension relation by V v V


Definition  A balloon model is a triple M  hW g V i with W a nonempty nite set
of worlds called the balloon g the root or generator of the model and V a global valuation
function V  W  fgg  VAL such that V 
w v V 
g for certain w  W  We also write M
g
for such a model notice that any combination of w  W and V  W  VAL gives rise to a
balloon model M
w
 hWw V i
The truth and falsity of a formula   L in a balloon model M  hW g V i written as
M j  and M j  respectively are dened by induction

For a general approach see  Thi
 or  JT

 The Logic 
M  j  M  j 
M j  p  V gp    p  P M  j p  V gp    p  P
M j    M  j   M  j   M j   
M j      M j    and M j    M  j    M  j   or M  j 
M j     M
w
j    for all w W M  j    M
w
 j   for some w W
Note the special role played in the truth denition by the root of the model Although
we usually display the models with the root outside of the balloon the recursive  clauses
show that this need not be the case 
Alternatively we can duplicate the root the new root
being outside of the balloon Also note that the truthdenitions yield the intended e	ect
for formulas we have that M j   M
w
j  for some w  W  In particular our
partial semantics makes     and hence    invalid This reects the idea that
in our opinion formulas should express some positive evidence about  not just lack of
knowledge of  
For any model M  hW g V i we dene the theory Th
M of M by Th
M  f  L j
M j g the knowledge 
M inM by 
M  f  L jM j  g and the possibilities 	
M
by 	
M  f  L jM j g Note that M   
 
Th
M and 	
M  
 
Th
M Let 
and  be sets of formulas We write  j  if all balloon models which verify all members
of  also verify at least one of the elements of  ie M   
 Th
M    Th
M  
Finally we write M j  for  
 Th
M
The following proposition presents two counterparts of a persistence result from partial
propositional logic for balloon models
Proposition  Let M  hW g V i and M

 hW

 g

 V

i be two balloon models Then
for all w  W  fgg and all w

 W

 fg

g
V 
w v V


w

 	  L

 
M
w
j 	 M

w
 
j 	
For every balloon model M  hW g V i and ww

 W  fgg
V 
w v V 
w

   L  
M
w
j M
w
 
j 
Proofs for these two simple observations can be obtained immediately by the persistence
of L

with respect to the extension relation over VAL Bla We call the former property
propositional persistence and the latter internal persistence The way of ordering possible
worlds in a balloon model by only considering their local truthassignment is too limited to
give a sucient and necessary condition of informational expansion of balloon models The
following notion will settle this equivalence
Definition  For two balloon models M  hW g V i and M

 hW

 g

 V

i we say that
M

is a bisimulation extension of M  if
 V 
g v V


g
 w  W w

 W

such that V 
w v V


w


 w

 W

w  W such that V 
w v V


w


 The Logic 
This denition is in fact a special case of a more complex denition for arbitrary partial
Kripke models 
which have a genuine accessibility relation which in its turn is linked to the
general notion of bisimulation in process algebra and modal logic

Theorem  M

is a bisimulation extension of M    L M j M

j 
Proof The left to right direction of the theorem can be proved by a simple induction over the
construction of Lformulas The L

part is in fact the same as the propositional persistence
result in proposition  which is applicable through the rst requirement in denition 
Persistence of formulas of the form   and    are immediate consequences of the third
and second requirement in denition  respectively
From right to left suppose that M

 hW

 g

 V

i is not a bisimulation extension of M 
hW g V i By denition  we have one of the following cases
 V 
g v V


g

 Applying proposition  we nd a formula 	  L

such that M j 	
and M

j 	
 w  W w

 W

 V 
w v V


w

 For such w proposition  gives us for each
w

 W

 a formula 	
w
 
 L

for which M
w
j 	
w
 
 but M

w
 
j 	
w
 
 But then
M j 
V
w
 
W
 
	
w
 
 whereas M

j 
V
w
 
W
 
	
w
 

 w

 W

w  W  V 
w v V


w

 For such w

proposition  gives us for each
w  W  formulas 	
w
 L

such that M
w
j 	
w
M

w
 
j 	
w
 But then M j  
W
wW
	
w

whereas M

j  
W
wW
	
w

Summarizing we see that ifM

is not a bisimulation extension ofM  we always nd a formula
 for which M j  M

j 
 Deductions in L
We now formally dene the deductive machinery of our logic The sequent    with
 
 L should be understood as the disjunction of the members of  follows from the
conjunction of the formulas in  In such a sequent  and  are considered to be sequences
rather than sets Instead of   fg and   we write   and  respectively
We use a sequential axiomatization of partial logic for several reasons

It is short and clearly
marks the di	erence with classical logic in a deductive fashion Moreover it smoothes the
metatheory of partial logic 
see also JT and Jas The latter advantage becomes clear
in this paper in subsections  and 
Definition 	 To start with we distinguish the following structural rules
         start

    
 

 
 



 

mon

   

   



 

cut

See eg  Sti In  Jas
 this general notion has been used to transfer other information relations from
partial propositional logic to partial modal logic

Cf  Thi
 for a dierent natural deduction type presentation
 The Logic 
The following rules explain how the logical constants are introduced on the left 
l
true and
right hand side 
r
true of the sign respectively possibly accompanied with a negation
sign 
l
false or r
false First we give the propositional rules for the connectives

  
   
l
true 

   
    
l
false   
  
    
r
false  
    	 r
false 	

    
     
l
true  
   

 



   

r
true 

    

   



 
   

l
false  
    
   
  
r
false 
We add the following epistemic rules to this propositional basis

   
   
l
true   
   
      
r
true  

    
       
l
false   
   
    

 

   
      



    
     

 
Obvious gaps in this system L are l
true 	 
	   and r
true  
   
   

It turns out that the former rule is derivable in L The latter rule cannot be derived in L
Adding rule r
true   to system L would make L coincide with the classical modal system
S
Definition  The rules above are called Lrules A sequence  
 L is said to be L
derivable from another sequence  
 L  
L
 if    can be derived by a nite number of
applications of Lrules We usually drop the subscript L in the sequel Then two formulas
   L are said to be equivalent  a  if    and   
Derivable sequents are at least valid on balloon models
Lemma   Soundness For all  
 L     j 
Proof We prove soundness of l
true   and r
true   To start with l
true   suppose
that   j  This means that for arbitrary balloon models M we have M j   fg 

  M j 
 

 The Logic 
To prove   j  suppose that N  hW g V i is an arbitrary balloon model for which
N j f g This means that both N
g
j  and N
g
j   By denition of balloon model
there is some w  W with V 
w v V 
g Since N
g
j   we have for this w that N
w
j 
Now by internal persistence we conclude that N
g
j  Thus we have N
g
j   fg and
applying 
 we get N
g
j 
 for some 
  
To prove soundness of r
true   suppose that  j   Let M be a model hW g V i
such that M j   So M
w
j  for all w  W  Now suppose M j   then for some
u  W we have M
u
j  Since  j   we have M
u
j  
 for certain 
   and hence
M j   
 Therefore M j     for an arbitrary balloon model M verifying   hence
  j    
Let us pause for a moment and reect on our logic Claims below that some sequents are
not derivable are now easily veried semantically as is justied by lemma 
 The rst thing to note about the logic is that it is indeed partial which is mirrored
by the fact that we do not have the law of excluded middle    In fact as is
shown in Thi there is not any theorem of L in the f	gfree language This can
immediately be seen from the surface of the sequential presentation of L The only
way to obtain an empty left hand argument in a sequent is to use r
false 	 The
nonderivability of the law of excluded middle can also be demonstrated directly by a
counterexample applying the soundness result in lemma  Any balloon model with
an empty valuation

on its root is a counterexample for p  p
 Moreover we do not have contraposition         
 Although L lacks contraposition and does not have any f	gfree theorems much of
the structure of classical logic is preserved Wellknown principles such as the laws of
De Morgan and double negation and properties such as associativity idempotence and
commutativity of the disjunction and conjunction are also valid in L
 For the dened symbols one easily proves the following derived rules
    l
false     r
true 
    

   



    

l
true 
   
    
r
true 
    
 
    
l
false 
    

  



  
  

r
false 
   
   
l
true 
   
    
r
false 
 For the epistemic part we have the following
Conjoining knowledge     a  
  
Disjoining epistemic possibility 
  a 

A valuation V is empty in world w of DomV w   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Positive introspection         
Negative introspection             
Veridicality       
Consistency of knowledge    	
Note that although we do have veridicality of knowledge 
known facts are true we got
rid of its contrapositive 
true facts are considered to be possible A counterexample
can be given by the simple balloon model existing of a root g and one world W  fwg
such that V 
g
p   and an empty valuation at w Then hW g V i is a balloon model
because V 
w v V 
g It veries p but not p
Negative introspection is now better motivated than in classical S if some fact is
considered possible by the agent it is explicitly present in his set of alternatives so he
knows that particular possibility This should be contrasted to the classical case where
merely not knowing the opposite is supposed to involve knowledge of the possibility
In the sequel we will denote a property like positive introspection by       or
 
To see the system L at work we will provide a proof of the property that nestings of
modal operators are in fact superuous 
theorem  Later on this property will be
used in our completeness proof Let us rst dene the modal depth md
 of a formula 
by md
p  md
	   
p  P md
   md
 md
    max
md
md

md
     md
 By using the propositional equivalences as stated above and treating
formulas like   and  as literals we obtain the following normal forms in L 
Proposition    Every   L is equivalent to a formula of the form
n

i 
m

j 

ij
where each 
ij
is of the form   with md
  md
  with md
  md
  p or p
If n   we interpret the disjunction as 	 and if n   but m   as  We call the format
displayed above a semidisjunctive normal form of  There also exists a semiconjunctive
normal form
n

i 
m

j 

ij
where the formulas 
ij
are of the same form as above
The following lemma is the heart of theorem  it explains how nestings of modal operators
are removed
Lemma   We have
 
   a     and 
   a    
 The Logic 	

Proof We only prove the rst equivalence the second is similar
      start      start
    start        rtrue  
        ltrue            rtrue   
          rtrue          start
                  rtrue  
          cut            rtrue   
           rtrue              
         cut 

           ltrue  
Corollary  
 

W
n
i 
 
i

W
m
j 

j
 	 a
W
n
i 
 
i

W
m
j 

j
  	


V
n
i 
 
i

V
m
j 

j
 	 a
V
n
i 
 
i

V
m
j 

j
	
By means of these preliminaries we now easily establish
Theorem   Every   L is equivalent to a formula 

with md


  
The proof runs by induction on the modal depth of formulas Obviously the result for the
basic step is for free
Let the modal depth of  be larger than  By proposition   is equivalent to the
semidisjunctive normal form
n

i 


m

j 
 
ij



k 

ik
 	
i

with 	  L

 md

ij
  md
 and md

ik
  md

The induction hypothesis applies to all the formulas 
ij
and 
ik
 This means that these
formulas can be assumed to have a modal depth at most  If this result can also be obtained
for  
ij
and 
ik
 then the result has been shown for the formula  This result can
be obtained quite easily by using lemma  together with  
  

 a 
    

 and



 a 


 If  has modal depth  it must be equivalent to the semiconjunctive
normal form
 a
n
 

i 


m
 

j 
 
ij


 

k 

ik
 	
i
 with 	
i
 
ij
 
ik
 L


while each  is equivalent to the semidisjunctive normal form
 a
n
  

i 


m
  

j 
 
ij


  
k 

ik
 
i
 with 
i
 
ij
 
ik
 L


 The Logic 		
Corollary  yields after applying r
true   and  distribution over  for each  and 
in the semidisjunctive normal form of 
  a
V
n
 
i 


W
m
 
j 
 
ij

W

 
k 

ik
 	
i
 and
 a
W
n
  
i 


V
m
  
j 
 
ij

V

  
k 

ik
	
i

Clearly the latter formulas have a modal depth not larger than 
Combined with proposition  this theorem also implies that every formula has a semi
disjunctive and a semiconjunctive normal form of at most modal depth 
	 Completeness
The aim of this section is to prove that the logic L is complete for the class of balloon
models By denition  our models are 
nite as a consequence not each consistent set will
be satisable 
eg f
p
 
     p
n  
  p
n
 j n  INg has only innite models We can
guarantee satisability of 
nite sets However this requirement can be eased a little what
we can prove is that  j     for those  and  for which the set of atoms in  is
nite To avoid cumbersome notation from now on we simply assume that P itself is nite
We rst show that this assumption implies that L is logically 
nite
Proposition   L is logically nite there are only nitely many nonequivalent formu
las
Proof From the proof of theorem  we can infer that every formula in L is equivalent to
a semidisjunctive normal form of modal degree   Since P is assumed to be nite modulo
logical equivalence there are only nitely many distinct formulas in L

 Thus there are only
nitely many logically di	erent choices for the 
ij
 
ik
and 	
i
in the semidisjunctive normal
form displayed on page  Therefore there are only nitely many nonequivalent formulas
For Henkinstyle completeness proofs in classical 
modal logic the notion of maximal
consistency is used HC A maximally consistent set of formulas is a consistent set which
cannot be extended consistently Maximally consistent sets facilitate completeness proofs
since they form the syntactic counterparts of possible worlds These sets enable the construc
tion of a canonical model The corresponding completeness proof amounts to demonstrating
that the canonical model is a counterexample for any nonsequent of the associated logic
Partial systems require a more exible and general notion to mimic worlds in this way
The requirement of maximality disappears which relates to the failure of the law of excluded
middle in 
most partial systems Sequentially formulated systems enable a short and general
denition of setsasworlds In partial logic and other nonclassical logic the relevant concept
is known as saturation
Definition   Let ! and " be subsets of L Then
 ! is consistent i	 !  
 ! 
 L is saturated i	 for every  !    !     SAT is the collection of all
saturated sets 
in L
 The Logic 	 
 " is a saturator of ! i	 "    for all  such that !   In such a case we write
! "
# 
 L being a saturator of a set  
 L boils down to nonderivability from  of the
formulas not in #
Observation  
 #    #
The direction is a direct consequence of the denition of saturators 
#  #   The
converse follows from the monotonicity rule Suppose  # then there exists  such that
   and   #   This means that  
 # and therefore   #
The original denition of saturation goes back to Acz and Tho where it has been
used to prove completeness for rst order intuitionistic logic Usually saturation is presented
as a combination of three properties consistency deductive closure and disjunctive saturation

ie !    !   or !   These properties follow immediately by taking    
and  respectively in our sequential denition above
The following three lemmas describe the Lindenbaumpart of the Henkin construction
The standard Lindenbaum lemma says that every consistent set is a subset of a maximally
consistent set In completeness proofs of partial and constructive logics this lemma is not
sucient In this kind of systems we are often confronted with certain upper bounds in
the syntactic construction of saturated sets Fortunately saturated sets are not necessar
ily maximally consistent and therefore the generalization of Lindenbaums lemma given in
lemma  turns out to be satisfactory for partial systems It says that if such an upper
bound is a saturator of a set of formulas then a saturated set can be found which extends
the original set and which respects the upper bound
In order to prove this general Lindenbaum result we give a short lemma which justies
the construction steps for saturated extensions within saturators
Lemma  	
If # and    for certain nite set  
 L then there exists a 
   such that f
g#
Proof Let   # and    with  nite and suppose that   f
g# for all 
   This
means that for all 
   there exists !


 L such that
 
  !

and !

 #  
Let ! 
S

!

 mon yields  
  ! for all 
   Application of cut to this last sequent
and the assumption    yields    n f
g! Repetition of cutapplication for all 
s
eliminates the complete  from the last sequent In all   ! Because   # we conclude
!  #   This contradicts that !

 #   for all 
  
Lemma   saturation lemma
If   # then there exists a saturated set 

such that  
 


 #
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Proof Let  # and let f
i
g
iIN
be an enumeration of # We dene the following sequence
of subsets of L
S


 

n	 



n
 f
n
g if 
n
 f
n
g  #

n
otherwise
We dene 

to be the limit of this sequence




nIN

n

 
 


 # is immediately clear from the denition of 

above Another direct consequence
of the construction above is 
n
 # for all n  IN  What is left to show is 

 SAT 
Suppose 

  We need to prove 

    The assumption set can be reduced to
a nite sequence 
 
  
m
in 

such that 
 
  
m
  Because every member of 

is a
member of some 
i
 this means that there exists 
k
such that f
 
  
m
g 
 
k



and thus

k
  according mon Since 
k
 # we also have   #   Since  
 L has been
picked arbitrarily as an conclusion set of 

we have 

 # This conclusion combined with
lemma  guarantees the existence of a formula 
   such that


 f
g  #
This result also ensures that 
n
 f
g # for all n  IN  because all these sets are subsets of
the limit set 



Obviously 
  # which means that there exists   IN such that 

 

Because 

 f

g  # we know that 
  
	 
by the inductive denition of the sequence
f
n
g
nIN
 We conclude 
  

 and so 

    This establishes the desired result


 SAT 
The converse of this lemma is a trivial result In other words   # is a precise criterion
for # to contain a saturated extension of  Note that the construction closely resembles
the standard proof procedure for the Lindenbaum lemma In fact the classical Lindenbaum
lemma is the special case where #  L

Given the result in observation $ the saturation lemma is equivalent to a more frequently
used version which we call the separation lemma
Lemma  separation lemma
If !   then there exists a saturated set  such that ! 
  and     
Proof If    then    
observation $ Lemma  shows that !  SAT   

! % ! 
  This last conjunct means that !   

The reason to present the last two lemmas separately is purely pragmatic The saturation
lemma is convenient when we are restricted by upper bounds in the construction of a saturated
set and the separation lemma is useful when nonderivability comes on stage

Take for example k  max
if ng

n
i
where f
n
i
g
m
i 
is a subsequence of f
n
g
nIN
with 
i
 
n
i


By mon we have    
 
  
 
 
	
 is consistent i  L


To see that the separation lemma also implies the saturation lemma suppose that    which means
   according to observation  Substituting  for  in the separation lemma gives us the desired result
immediately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Definition   Canonical Model
Let  be a saturated set We dene the canonical model for  asM

 hW

Vi where
 W

 f! j ! is saturated and  
 
 
 ! 
 
 
g
 For all !  W

 fg and p  P  V
!
p 

 if p  !
 if  p  !
Lemma  The canonical modelM

is a balloon model
Proof 
Cf Denition 
 W

is nite by proposition 
 
 V is welldened since saturated sets are consistent
 The root  is an extension of some world in the balloon ie for some !  W

it
holds that V
! v V
 To see this we claim that  
 
  "  
 
   then
we are done since then 
by the saturation lemma there is a saturated ! such that
 
 
 
 ! 
 
 
   Therefore !  W

and ! 
  and so V
! v V
 The proof
of the claim about " is as follows
By induction on nite # 
 L we prove that
 
 
  # #   
 
  
Because  
 
  
  
the implication above holds trivially for #   So suppose
#  f
 
     
n
g 
n   and  
 
  # Then by n   applications of r
true  we
have for each 
i  n 
 
  

 
     
i  
 
i	 
     
n
 
i
and hence by using
r
true   we obtain
i  n     

 
     
i  
 
i	 
     
n

i
Since  is saturated we have two possibilities
 For some i  n  

 
    
i  

i	 
    
n
   Then  
 
  # n f
i
g and
by the induction hypothesis # n f
i
g 
 
   and hence #
 
  
 For all i  n
i
  Then # 
 
 
 
a and since  
 
  # by the l
true
 rule we have   # and hence by saturation of    #   
b Combining

a and 
b we obtain #  
 
  
 
Notice this is virtually the only place where the specic introspection rules of L are used in the com
pleteness proof Ie these rules license the special form of our balloon models
  
 

      

  	     	   	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Lemma  truth lemma
For all formulas   L and all sets   SAT and each canonical modelM


M

j     M

j     
Proof By induction on  we only give the  step So we assume that     while the
induction hypothesis 
IH says that the lemma holds for 
First we show the equivalence for j
 If M

j   then by the truth denition of   for all   W

M

j  By IH we
conclude that for all   W

    Now consider
   
 
 

After observing that 
 
  f j   g we claim that 
 holds for suppose
not then by r
true   and mon we also have  
 
  
 
 and we use the separation
lemma to nd a  for which 
 
 
  
 
 
 and    contradicting IH Thus since

 holds we may use saturation of  to conclude that either     or 
 
  
Since the latter is impossible we conclude that    
 Suppose     and choose   W

 which means that   SAT and  
 
 
  


 
 We immediately nd    and by IH M

j  so thatM

j  
Next the steps for j are
 If M

j   then by the falsity condition for   for some   W

 M

j  and
using IH     Since  
 
 
     and since  is deductively closed
    
 Suppose      We claim that  
 
  f g  
 
 To see this suppose that &
is such that  
 
  f g  & then by l
false   also   
 
    & and by
monotonicity     & Since    is already a member of  this implies   &
Now we use saturation of  to nd a formula  in   & so   
 
  & Now
we have proven the claim we use the saturation lemma to obtain a saturated set 
with  
 
  f g 
  
 
 
 Clearly   W

    so we apply IH to conclude
M

j 
Theorem  Completeness For all ! 
 L ! j  !  
Proof Suppose !   then using the separation lemma we obtain a saturated set  for
which ! 
  and     Clearly by lemma M

j ! and M

j 
 for all 
  
hence ! j 
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 Honesty
This section concerns both the syntactic and semantic view on circumscription and hon
esty Circumscribing the knowledge expressed by say  is to characterize what a rational
agent knows when he or she only knows  
together with its logical consequences If such
circumscription is possible  is called honest in HM Though it may seem prima facie
that circumscribing  is always possible 
by taking the deductive closure of   this need
not be the case As we noticed earlier the formula    p   p cannot be circumscribed
and is hence dishonest
The main issue we want to address in this section is the problem of deciding which formulas
can be rendered honest We will in fact present several notions of honesty in section  and
illustrate them by means of a number of examples Most of the technical justication for
these examples is provided after we have given a semantic account of the various notions of
honesty and are therefore postponed until section  In section  we supply inferential
tests 
socalled disjunction properties which are particularly convenient for demonstrating
that a formula is dishonest
	 Stable Sets
We start out by investigating the deductive view on circumscription and honesty Which
criteria does the set C
 
consisting of the consequences of   have to meet to consider 
honest' The crucial notion here is that of a stable set
 
Although stability can be dened
in many ways the notion itself is stable since various denitions turn out to be equivalent
Thinking of C
 
 f j    g as the epistemic state of a rational agent knowing only
 it is clear that a stable set at least has to be a consistent theory 
Cf denition 
In addition to being a consistent theory we want a stable set to have the property that the
ignorance of nonconsequences is compatible with the knowledge of consequences In Moo
and Jasb this leads to the following requirements for a stable set with respect to a normal
modal system
 S is a theory
  S    S is consistent
Though correct for normal systems the latter requirement is too strong for the partial logic we
advocate Recall from section  that our logic does not have any f	gfree theorems Yet
we want to allow the set S  C
 
to be stable characterizing the epistemic state of an agent
knowing nothing However S is unstable by the second requirement since    
p   p
we have that 
p   p  S and therefore f   
p   pg would be consistent which it
is not So we propose to replace the requirement above by the more general condition that
knowledge of nonconsequences does not follow from the initial knowledge
Definition   Stability
A set S of formulas is stable if S is a theory for which  S   S
Notice that stable sets are consistent suppose that S is an inconsistent theory By the

derived rule l
true 	 and the theoricity of S we have S  L and hence  S   The
 
See  Sta  Moo  HM for S stability  Jas
b denes stability for arbitrary normal systems Our
text denition is from  Thi
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inconsistency of S implies that of  S ie  S   and therefore  S   S which means that
S is not stable
The insightful but somewhat esoteric denition  can be recast in a format which is closer
to Stalnakers original formulation
Proposition 
S is a stable set of formulas i	
 S is a theory
 if   S then    S 
positive introspection
 if       S then   S or   S 
modal saturation
   S for some  
consistency
Lemma  modal saturation
For all consistent theories S modal saturation is equivalent to
S    S     for all  
 L
Proof Modal saturation is obviously implied by the above requirement For the other
direction suppose that S    First note that the consistency of S implies that    By
the niteness of L we may assume that  is nite say f
 
     
n
g So S   
 
     
n

therefore 
by corollary  S   
 
 
      
n
 and thus 
by lemma  S   
 

 
 

      
n
 Therefore by modal saturation 
 
 S or  

      
n
 Repeating
this argument it follows that for some i 
i
 S
Because of this equivalence we will also refer to the elegant property displayed in lemma 
by modal saturation
Proof of proposition 	

 Let S be a stable set Then
 by denition S is a theory
 suppose   S and    S then since       S violates the  condition in
denition 
 suppose for some  we have S    and S    then  
 S so   
  S so that
by monotonicity S   S and by l
true    S   S contradicting the stability of S
 S is consistent so p   p  S

 Next let S satisfy the conditions 
( then S is a theory thus 
by  and ex falso
consistent Suppose  S   S By 
  S 
 S so by mon S   S Lemma  tells us that
S  S   a contradiction
Although the characterization of stability given by proposition  is useful sometimes a
more concise requirement is convenient Since saturated sets are the possible worlds in the
canonical model the proposition essentially means that a stable set consists of all and only
formulas known in some world
 Honesty 	
Proposition  S is stable i	 S   
 
 for some   SAT 
Proof 
 Let S be stable then  S   S By the separation lemma there is a saturated
set  such that 
i  S 
  and 
ii    S   Then   S  
by i         
 

and   S      S  
by ii         
 
 Hence S   
 
 
 Suppose
S   
 
 for some saturated set  and also that  S   S Since  S 
  and using mon
we have    S  is saturated and hence there is some   S with     But then
since  is deductively closed we have     and hence   S a contradiction
Having characterized stability in di	erent ways we are ready for a formal account of cir
cumscription and honesty Writing ST 
 for fS 
 L j   S % S is stable g circumscription
of knowledge of  involves nding a minimal element in ST 
 the set of stable expansions
of  If there is a stable set which is minimum according to some order on sets of formulas
the knowledge is honest What is this ordering relation' In the paradigm case of the 
total
system S di	erent stable sets are incomparable so set inclusion does not work This is not
the case for the present 
partial system basically because the notorious Stalnaker condition
  S      S does not hold for stable sets in partial logic The invalidity of the latter
condition implies that in L a stable set is not determined by its propositional content 
the
purely propositional formulas in it although a stable set is determined by its formulas of
degree  
ie with modal depth less or equal to  by theorem  This might suggest set
inclusion as the ordering relation of the stable sets and a denition of honesty induced by

 basically existence of a smallest stable expansion
Definition  Nave Honesty
 is called navely honest if there is a 
minimal element in ST 

Example  The formulas p p  q  p  
p  q p and 
p q are na)*vely honest
Can we give other sucient and necessary conditions for na)*ve honesty' To this purpose
reinspect C
 
 f j    g Observe that
 C
 
is a theory since  is transitive for single formulas
 C
 
is contained in every stable set containing  let   S for some stable S then by
proposition 
    S so by proposition 
 S contains all the consequences of
  ie C
 

 S
As an easy result we now present a necessary and sucient condition for a stable set to be

minimal
Theorem  A set S is 
minimal in ST 
 i	 S  C
 
is stable
Proof 
 Suppose S is 
minimal for  By denition   S and by the remark above
C
 

 S Now suppose that S 
 C
 
 then we have a  with   S and     The
separation lemma then provides a saturated set  for which        Since    
and  is a theory we also have     By proposition   
 
 is a stable set containing
 contradicting the 
minimality of S

 If C
 
is a stable set then by the remarks above it must be 
minimal
The theorem above immediately provides a necessary and sucient condition for na)*ve
honesty
 Honesty 	
Corollary 	  is na)*vely honest i	 C
 
is stable
Proof Let C
 
be stable By l
true     C
 
 By theorem $ C
 
is also 
minimal
for  implying that  is na)*vely honest The other direction is obvious
Example  The objective formula p q is not na)*vely honest For suppose that S would
be 
minimal in ST 
p  q then 
p  q  S and by proposition 
 also  
p  q  S
Since 
by r
true   and    we have  
p q   p q we use proposition 

to conclude that either p  S or q  S 
 Now let !
 
 f pg and !

 f qg Using
completeness we immediately see that !
 
  q and !

  p The separation lemma then
guarantees the existence of saturated sets 
 


for which !
i

 
i

i    q  
 
and
 p  

 By proposition  we nd two stable sets S
i
  
 

i
 
i    S
i
 ST 
p  q
for which q  S
 
and p  S

 Since S is 
minimal in ST 
p  q we nd p  Sq  S
contradicting 

Intuition says that all objective 
ie propositional formulas should be rendered honest it
seems to be perfectly sensible to claim to only know some objective information Together
with example  we see that the denition of na)*ve honesty is too strong and also too na)*ve
Thus though the set inclusion ordering of stable sets is 
nontrivially possible it produces
wrong results as far as honesty is concerned Now one alternative is to replace ordinary set
inclusion by the relation of epistemic inclusion 

 
 This however will not produce any new
results due to the following observation
Observation   For all stable sets   

 
  
 
Somewhat surprisingly since its propositional content does not determine a stable set
propositional minimality of a stable expansion produces a more adequate notion of honesty
In this way we obtain essentially the same denition of honesty as was proposed in HM
However in L one can generally derive less conclusions from the circumscription of a weakly
honest formula than in the S case For example p is honest in S and also weakly honest
in L but knowing only p entails di	erent conclusions in both setups
Definition    Weak Honesty
 is weakly honest if there is a 


minimal element in ST 

Observation   All na)*vely honest formulas are weakly honest
Example   So p is weakly honest The disjunction p  q is also weakly honest more
generally for each consistent objective formula 	 	 itself  	 and 	 are weakly honest
Other examples of weakly honest formulas are 
 pq and disjunctions such as  p  p
and p  p The formula  p q is not weakly honest nor is  p p 
This will be proved
in section 
Notice that a propositionally smallest stable expansion for some formula need not be
unique S  L

does not determine S For example in the case of p  q S may or may
not contain 
p  q
 Honesty  

Theorem   A set S is 


minimal in ST 
 i	 S  ST 
 and S

 C
 
 f 
L

j    g
Proof Omitted essentially the same as the proof of theorem $
Corollary    is weakly honest i	 S

 
C
 


for some stable expansion S of 
As we noticed in the introduction a similar argument that motivates that 
 p q should not
be considered honest can be applied to 
pq neither can be circumscribed intuitively
spoken This is why the current notion of honesty is too weak
Example   The formulapq is weakly honest
 
This will be shown in section 
Analyzing the reason for this counterintuitive result we note that for weak honesty we did
minimize the objective formulas in the stable set for  but not the possibilities contained in
it In fact 


minimality is insuciently restrictive among the 


minimal stable sets we
want to single out those containing the smallest number of epistemic possibilities This is
achieved in our last notion of honesty
Definition   Strong Honesty
A formula  is called strongly honest if S is strongly minimal for  ie there is a 


minimal
element in fS 
 L j S is 


minimal in ST 
 g
Example  	 Now p  q is not strongly honest As with weak honesty for each
objective formula 	  L

 the formulas 	 and  	 are strongly honest 
this follows from the
observation below but now 
p  q is not strongly honest 
for a proof of the latter fact
see section 
Observation   All na)*vely honest formulas are strongly honest and all strongly honest
formulas are weakly honest
In order to characterize the stable sets that contain a strongly honest formula we need a
lemma that we will not prove until section  and one more denition
Lemma  Let S and S

be stable sets such that  
 
S 


 
 
S

and 
 
S 



 
S

 Then
S 
 S


Definition   For a formula  we dene its diamond remainder R

 
as
R

 
 f  
L

 j     
C
 


  g
In words R

 
contains formulas with a propositional argument that are derivable from
  in disjunction with those  formulas of which the argument is propositional and not a
consequence of  
Theorem  A set S is strongly minimal for  i	 S

 
C
 


and S L

 R

 
and
S  ST 

 
Notice that pq is also honest in the analysis of S as given in  HM
 Honesty  	
Proof

 Let S be 


minimal in fS 
 L j S is 


minimal in ST 
 g 


minimality of S
for  implies S

 
C
 



theorem  In order to show that R

 

 S L

 suppose
  R

 
 Then
    
C
 


 

Proposition  shows that there exists a   SAT such that S   
 
 Because    
and 

  
 
C
 


 fg   

Theorem  and the 


minimality of S entail    
C
 


  which means  
 
 Since     we nd   S  L

 The arbitrariness of   R

 
now
guarantees R

 

 S L


To see that also S L


 R

 
 suppose   R

 
with   L

 then
    
C
 


 

Using the separation lemma we nd a   SAT for which        
C
 


 
and    The rst two conclusions imply that  
 
 is a 


minimal stable set for 

Cf theorem  The last conclusion entails   S because S is 


minimal among the



minimal stable sets

 Suppose that both S L

 
C
 


and S L

 R

 
for some S  ST 
 Let S

be an arbitrary stable set for  that is 


minimal We have to show that
S 


S

 

By lemma  it is sucient to show that both  
 
S 


 
 
S

and 
 
S 



 
S

 Since
S L

 
C
 


 by theorem  we have S 


S

so in particular  
 
S 


 
 
S

 What is
left to prove is 
 
S 



 
S


Suppose that we have some   L

with   S Since S L

 R

 

    
C
 


 

By 


minimality of S

for  and theorem  we obtain S

 L

 
C
 


 hence S



C
 


  and 

  
C
 


  for certain 

 SAT with S

  
 


 This implies
  


 and 
since     also    
 


 S


Corollary   is strongly honest i	 there is an S  ST 
 with
S

 
C
 


and 

 
S

 f j 
i
 L

     
 
      
n
 %   
i
g
 Honesty   
	 Minimal Models
Proposition  ties up the notion of stable set with a main semantic notion recall that
saturated sets correspond to partial worlds in the canonical model The following corollary
of proposition  relates stability directly to the knowledge in a balloon model
Corollary  S is stable i	 S  
M for some balloon model M 
In order to decide whether some formula is honest we considered stable sets that were minimal
in some sense Combined with corollary  the following orders on models emerge
Definition  For any two models M  hW g V i and M

 hW

 g

 V

i we dene
 M v
 
M

 w

 W

w  W  V 
w v V


w


 M v

M

 w  W w

W

 V 
w v V


w


 M vM

 
M v
 
M

% M v

M


 For any  fv
 
v

vg we say that a model M is minimal for  if   
M and
for all M

with   
M

 it holds that M M

 We then say that  has a minimal
model
The above orders are familiar from domain theory see eg Sto$$ they are known as the
Smyth Hoare and EgliMilner order respectively The orders do not specify anything about
the root g of a model M  hW g V i Recall that Th
M  f   L jM j  g that

M   
 
Th
M and 	
M  
 
Th
M This is how 

 
and v
 
are related
Proposition  Consider two balloon models M  hW g V i and M

 hW

 g

 V

i
 M v
 
M

 Th
M  L



 
Th
M

  
M 



M


 M v

M

 Th
M L




Th
M

  	
M 


	
M


 M vM

% V 
g v V


g

  Th
M 
 Th
M


 M vM

 
M 
 
M

 	
M 
 	
M


Proof We only prove the rst item in extenso the second is proven similarly whereas the
third follows from denition  and theorem $ The facts in the last item can be deduced
from the others using the degree  normal forms from the proof of theorem  for the rst
equivalence
So suppose that M v
 
M

and let  be some propositional formula for which M j  
ie for all w  W  M
w
j  Choose any v

 W

 Since M v
 
M

there is a v  W such
that V 
v v V


v

 and so since   L

we use propositional persistence 
proposition 
to conclude M

v
 
j  Since v

was arbitrary we have M

j   The opposite direction
is proved using contraposition if M v
 
M

 then there is some w

 W

such that for all
w  W  V 
w v V


w

 So for each w  W there is a literal 
w
 P   P such that
M
w
j 
w
and M

w
 
j 
w
 Now if  
W
wW

w
 obviously   L

and M
w
j  for all
 Honesty  
w  W  so M j   yet M

w
 
j  so M

j   Therefore 
M  L


 
M

 ie

M 



M


It is not hard to see that the restrictions to L

in the proposition are necessary In the case
of v
 
for instance let M

 hW

 g

 V

i such that V


w


p   for all w

 W

 Consider
M  hW g V i with W  W

 fxg for some x  W

 V 
x
p   and V 
w

  V


w

 for
all w

 W

 Although M v
 
M

 we have M j  p but at the same time M

j  p
Lemma 	 repeated
Let S and S

be stable sets such that  
 
S 


 
 
S

and 
 
S 



 
S

 Then S 
 S


Proof Let M and M

be such that S  
M S

 
M

 Applying the rst two items of
proposition  we obtain M v
 
M

and M v

M  hence M v M

and thus by the last
item of the same theorem S 
 S


Now we can characterize our di	erent notions of honesty in semantic terms
Theorem   is na)*vely honest i	   has a vminimal model
Proof Using corollary  and proposition  the argument is straightforward
  is naively honest  denition
S  ST   S
 
 ST    S 	 S
 
 cor 	

MM
 
    M      M
 

 M  	 M
 
  def  prop 	

MM
 
M j      M
 
j    
M v M
 
 def 	

M which is vminimal for   
Example 	 Figure  gives vminimalmodels for pq
pq and  
pq respectively
As was announced in example  these formulas are thus na)*vely honest by virtue of the M

and M

 Note that the existence of an empty balloon world such as in M and M

makes a
model immediately v
 
minimal

g
p q
M


g

p
M


p q


g

p q
M


p q
Figure  Three vminimal models
Theorem   is weakly honest i	   has a v
 
minimal model
Proof Again a direct argument is possible
  is weakly honest  def weak honesty
S  ST   S
 
 ST    S 	
 
S
 
 cor 	

MM
 
    M      M
 

 M  	
 
M
 
  def  prop 	

MM
 
M j      M
 
j    
M v
 
M
 
 def 	

M which is v
 
minimal for   
 Honesty  
Example  The modelsM andM

of gure  are v
 
minimal for  
pq and  p  p
respectively Moreover both models are v
 
minimal for  
p  q thus proving that
p q is weakly honest This justies claims of weak honesty made in examples  and


g
p
M

q

p

g

M


 p

Figure  Two v
 
minimal models
Connecting strong honesty with a semantic notion requires one more denition
Definition   A model M is called strongly minimal for  if M is v

minimal in the
set fM

jM

is v
 
minimal for  g
Note that strongly minimal models for  are by denition v
 
minimal for  Also note
however that a strongly minimal model need not be v

minimal
Theorem   is strongly honest i	   has a strongly minimal model
Proof

 Assume S to be 


minimal amongst the 


minimal stable sets for  and let M be a
model for which S  
M 
corollary  We will show that M is strongly minimal for 
ie M v

M

for any M

that is v
 
minimal for  Consider such an M

 Then as in the
proof of theorem  
M

 is 


minimal in ST 
 So by assumption 
M 



M


To draw the required conclusionM v

M

 it suces because of proposition  
 to show
that 	
M 


	
M

 This is straightforward   	
M L

 M j  M j  
  
M   
M

 M

j   M

j    	
M



 Let M be strongly minimal for   and S  
M If S

is some 


minimal stable set
for  the proof of theorem  shows that the modelM

for which S

 
M

 is v
 
minimal
for   We have to show that S 


S

 Since M was strongly minimal for   we have
that M v
 
M

and M v

M

 ie M vM

 Hence by proposition  
M 
 
M

 ie
S 
 S

 and so    Th
M then S 


S


Example  We argue that p  q is not strongly honest proving the claim made
in example  consider the two models M and M

that both have a balloon with two
worlds one being the empty world moreover M has a pworld 
ie a world in which p is
true that does not verify q where M

has a qworld that does not verify p Both models
verify  
pq and the empty world guarantees that they are v
 
minimal for  
pq
But then we also see that there can be no model N for  
pq for which both N v

M
and N v

M

 such a model N has to contain at least a p or a qworld if it has a pworld
then N v

M

 if it has a qworld then N v

M 
 Honesty  
		 Disjunction Properties
One might want to have an even more direct condition providing honesty without interference
of the notion of stability Here we will provide several syntactic or perhaps rather deductive
characterizations for honesty Inspecting the properties of saturated and stable sets one
good candidate for this is the disjunction property dened below In fact this property is
already mentioned in HC be it that there it is a property of logical systems rather than
of formulas In partial logic the property should be slightly reformulated and adapted to the
di	erent notions of honesty
Definition  Disjunction Properties
Let   L The following conditions determine when  has the disjunction property 
dp
the propositional disjunction property 
pdp or propositional diamond disjunction property

pddp respectively
dp ! 
 L      !   !     
pdp + 
 L

     + 	  +     	
pddp + 
 L

     
C
 


+ 	  +      
C
 


	
Observation 
 All disjunction properties imply consistency Take +!   for the arguments +! in
the rules of the denition above
 Note that           for all   L Furthermore         
   for every formula  These are simple consequences of corollary  This
observation facilitates proving the next theorem about the relation between di	erent
notions of honesty and the various disjunction properties which were presented in the
denition above
Theorem  Disjunction properties and honesty
 has the dp   is na)*vely honest
 has the pdp   is weakly honest
 has the pddp   is strongly honest
Proof We start by proving thedirection for the stated equivalences These are in fact al
most immediate consequences of the modal saturation property of stable sets 
Cf proposition
 item  and the various characterizations of minimal stable sets
 Let  be na)*vely honest This means it has a 
minimal stable set S Now suppose
    ! then S   ! By modal saturation we know S  !   According to
theorem $ S  C
 
 so for some   !     In other words  has the
disjunction property
 If  is weakly honest there is a similarly straightforward proof that  has the pdp
since by theorem  S  ST 
  S

 
C
 



 Honesty  
 Let  be strongly honest Suppose     
C
 


+ for certain + 
 L

 The second
item in observation  tells us that
    
C
 


 +
Let S be 


minimal amongst the 


minima of ST 
 Again modal saturation shows
that there exists a   
C
 


+ such that   S On account of theorem  we
know that S

 
C
 


 so  must be some 	 in + We also know from  that
S  L

 R

 
 so 	  R

 
 By denition of the diamond remainder of   we
conclude that     
C
 


	 the pddp
The direction of the proof is accounted for by the saturation lemma and the relation
between stability and saturation as formulated in proposition  Then following three
claims provide the desired results
a  has the dp  f g  #
 
  C
 
  L
b  has the pdp  f g  #

  
C
 


  L


c  has pdp % pddp  f g  #

  
C
 


R

 
 
 L

L


The following arguments show that these implications are sucient
  has dp  
saturation lemma claim a above
&  SAT  f g 
 & 
  C
 
 L  
S   
 
& proposition 
S  ST 
  S  C
 
 
corollary 
 is na)*vely honest
  has pdp  
saturation lemma claim b above
&  SAT  f g 
 & 
  
C
 


 L

 
S   
 
& proposition 
S  ST 
  S

 
C
 


 
theorem 
 is weakly honest
  has pddp  
saturation lemma claim c
&  SAT  f g 
 & 
  
C
 


R

 
  L

L

 
S   
 
&
S  ST 
  S

 
C
 


% 

 
S

 R

 
 
theorem 
 is strongly honest
What remains to be shown are the three claims a ( c above Recall that this boils down to
showing !  #
i
  for each ! for which    ! i  
a Suppose  has the dp and    !
 If !  L   we immediately obtain !  #
 
 
 Honesty  
 If !   L   then ! 
  L which means that !   !

for certain !


 L dp
guarantees the existence of a 

 !

such that    

 Since this means that
 

  C
 
 we may conclude !   C
 
  hence !  #
 
 
b Suppose  has the pdp and    !
If ! 
  L

then according to pdp there exists    ! such that     This means
! 
C
 


  If ! 
  L

 then ! L

  Consequently in all cases !#

 
c Suppose  has the pddp and    !
 If !  
 L

L

   then !  #

 
 Suppose ! 
  L

L


 If !  
C
 


  then also !  #

 
 Take !  L


  
C
 


 In this remaining case all formulas of ! are either
of the form 	 with 	  L

or   with   
C
 


 Application of the rule
mon yields
    
C
 


!L


According to pddp this means that there exist   ! L

such that   
 
C
 


  and therefore   R

 
 We conclude also in this last case
!  #

 
Since the disjunction properties are purely inferential and strictly related to the possibly
honest formula under inspection and neither involves extension to a stable set that is minimal
in some sense nor minimization in a class of models they provide a convenient tool for
testing honesty Disjunction properties are particularly useful for proving that some formula
is dishonest  as we will illustrate by reconsidering three examples
Example 
 Using the pdp it easily follows that p q is not even weakly honest 
Cf example 
 
 p q   p q so  
 p q   fp qg yet  
 p q  p and  
 p q  q

where nonderivability is shown by providing a countermodel as usual That  p p
is not weakly honest has a similar proof now by taking +  fp pg thus contradicting
the pdp
 Some of the earlier proofs can also be simplied For example example  now has a
very easy proof  
p q   p q yet  
p q  p and  
p q  q and thus dp
shows that p  q is not na)*vely honest
 Though less comfortable pddp can be used for an alternative proof of example 
  p q is not strongly honest since     
C
 


fp qg     
C
 


p
and     
C
 


q To show the latter consider the model M from example 
M veries   but does not verify q nor any element of  
C
 


 To make this last
point suppose that M j   for some   L

 Then in the empty balloon world 
M

j  thus 
by propositional persistence j  and therefore   
C
 



	 Conclusion  
 Conclusion
We have described a new epistemic logic with the remarkable feature that on the one hand
knowledge implies truth yet on the other hand truth does not imply epistemic possibility
thus avoiding at least one type of logical omniscience The logic is shown to be sound and
complete for socalled balloon models with partial interpretation
This logic is then used as a vehicle to study circumscription of knowledge We have
introduced di	erent notions of honesty each of which can be equivalently described in a
number of ways This results in a hierarchy of honesty since we can easily prove
 is na)*vely honest   is strongly honest   is weakly honest
Denitions of stability minimality of models with respect to knowledge and disjunction
properties which are given the classical study of honesty HM have been reformed in such a
way that they can successfully be transferred to partial logic for characterization of the three
notions of honesty which evolve from our system L As a summary of these characteristics
the following table depicts them once more
type Stable sets Balloon models Disjunction properties
naive 	minimality vminimality ordinary dp
weak 	
 
minimality v
 
minimality pdp
strong 	

min among 	
 
min 	

min among 	
 
min pddp
As we have illustrated on a number of examples na)*ve honesty is too strong 
ie it yields
too many dishonest formulas Weak honesty gives a similar analysis of honesty as Halpern
and Moses analysis The notion of strong honesty is preferred within the partial approach
By minimizing the size of worlds epistemic alternatives can be taken as small as possible
Moreover their number can also be reduced since not only knowledge but also possibilities
are minimized
This additional optimization enables us to give an analysis of nonmonotonic validity on the
basis of minimal knowledge states The following preferential consequence relation would
evolve from our concept of strong minimality
 j    is strongly honest and for all strongly minimal S  ST 
    S
This relation intuitively denotes that if  is only known then  is also known Due to
our partial background logic we nd no entailment of irrelevant possibilities eg
p j q
Notice that though many nonmonotonic entailments that were valid for the classical sys
tem S do not qualify for our partial system L such entailment still di	ers from 
partial
consequence and derivability we have for example

p  q  p % 
p  q j p
We can extend the latter example to show that j  is indeed a nonmonotonic relation we
have for instance
References  

p  q  p j p
This analysis shows the core di	erence with the classical approach of Halpern and Moses
Their approach also predicts the two last observations but with them possibility is the only
means to capture ignorance and therefore q follows from p in their denition of non
monotonic inference
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